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Abstract: Once relegated to cinema or history lectures, bank runs have become a 
modern phenomenon that captures the interest of students. We use a simple 
classroom experiment based upon the Diamond-Dybvig Model (1983) to 
demonstrate how a bank run, a seemingly irrational event, can occur rationally.  We 
then present possible topics for discussion including various ways to prevent bank 
runs and moral hazard. 
 
Introduction 
The subprime crisis has led to spectacular events in the world of finance. Bank runs, 
once relegated to cinema or history lectures, have become a modern phenomenon. 
For the UK, the queues formed during the Northern Rock bank run have been 
imprinted on our memory. The run and subsequent suspension of payments of 
Icelandic banks has led to widespread losses. These dramatic events have generated 
interest among students wishing for understanding. In this paper, we offer a teaching 
experiment based upon the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model that will help the students 
better understand bank runs and hence the current crisis. 
 
In this paper, we will describe both a computerized Internet version and a non-
computerized version of the experiment. Both can be run conveniently in less than an 
hour with some time left for discussion. The computerized version can be run over 
the Internet using our Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory at Exeter 
(FEELE) website. In the next section we describe the game illustrating the Diamond-
Dybvig model and its analysis in more detail. In Section 3 we describe the 
computerized version and the hand-run version of the experiment. Section 4 
discusses some results obtained from running the experiments. The Appendix 
provides instructions needed for the hand-run version 
Description and Analysis of the Diamond-Dybvig 
Model 
Our experiment is based upon the Diamond-Dybvig model (1983), which captures 
several elements of what a bank does. Our experiment focuses on the conversion of 
long-term loans (mortgages) into short-term deposits.1 It is this conversion that leads 
to the inherent problem of bank runs. 
In the model, there are depositors and a bank. There are three time periods: 
yesterday, today and tomorrow.  Depositors placed money (say £1000) in a bank 
(yesterday) before learning when they need the money (their preferences). Depositors 
either need their money today (are impatient) or tomorrow (are patient). There is a 
50% chance of needing the money at either time. The depositors that need money 
today get relatively very little utility for the money tomorrow. The depositors that 
need their money tomorrow can always take the money today and hold onto it.  
The bank has both a short term and a long term investment opportunity for the 
money. The short term investment (reserves) is equivalent to locking the money in 
the vault. This investment returns the exact amount invested. The long term 
investment returns an amount R tomorrow. It is illiquid and returns only L<1 today.  
The depositors that invested £1000 yesterday have a contract with the bank. They 
can withdraw their money today and receive £1000 or wait until tomorrow and 
receive R*£1000. Note, the bank needs to offer a contract contingent upon 
withdrawal time, since it does not know which depositors are patient and which are 
impatient, just the overall fraction. 
 
The bank that received deposits yesterday had to decide how to meet the potential 
demands of today and tomorrow. How does the bank meet this contract? The bank 
can divide the money into two parts. Take half and keep it as reserves. Take the other 
half and put it in the long term investment. Say there are 10 depositors: 5 impatient 
and 5 patient. If the 5 impatient depositors withdraw today and the 5 patient 
depositors withdraw tomorrow, the demands are 5*1000 today and 5*R*1000 
tomorrow. If the bank puts £5000 in the vault and invests £5000, then the bank has 
5000 today and R*5000 tomorrow and can fulfil the demands.2 
 
What the above shows us is that if all the depositors withdraw the money according 
to their types, then the bank will meet all the demands. In this case, each depositor 
has incentive to indeed withdraw according to his true type. An impatient depositor 
prefers 5000 today to R*5000 tomorrow. A patient depositor prefers R*5000 
tomorrow to 5000 today. Hence, all impatient depositors withdrawing today and all 
patient depositors withdrawing tomorrow is a Nash equilibrium.3 
                                                 
1
 The Diamond Dybvig model also captures a risk-sharing aspect of banking, namely, insuring 
depositors against needing money earlier rather than later. The contract used in our experiment is not 
the optimal risk-sharing contract, but one chosen to best illustrate the potential of bank runs.  
2
 We should also note that we are assuming that the bank makes zero profit (the industry is 
competitive). 
3
 An astute reader will note that a bank may not be able to pay the R*5000 tomorrow if 6 depositors 
withdraw tomorrow since it will only have 1000 from its reserves and R*5000 from the long-term 
asset; however, if the impatient depositor prefers 5000 today to R*5000 tomorrow, then he would also 
 While the contract is fulfilled in this Nash equilibrium, in other cases the bank cannot 
always remain solvent. If too many depositors try to withdraw today, it won’t be able 
to meet the contract tomorrow. For instance, if 7 out of 10 depositors withdraw 
today, then the bank can pay 5000 out of reserves. It then must sell its illiquid long-
term asset to meet the rest of the needs. The amount that must be liquidated is X such 
that X*L=2000. The remaining amount to pay the 3 depositors tomorrow is (5000-
(2000/L))*R. If, for instance, R=2 and L=.5, then this amount is 2000. Per depositor, 
this is less than the expected amount paid for withdrawing early. If a patient 
depositor thought 7 of the other depositors would withdraw early, then he would do 
better withdrawing early and receiving on average (5000+5000*L)/8=937.5 rather 
than waiting until tomorrow and receiving on average 2000/3=667.   
 
We can see that this leads to multiple (Nash) equilibria which are inherent in 
banking. One of the equilibria is the bank-run equilibrium. It is fairly easy to see this 
by looking at the equilibria with 2 impatient depositors and 2 patient depositors. 
Yesterday, each of the 4 depositors invested £1000. The bank then invests £2000 in 
the short-term investment and £2000 in the long-term investment. Today, two of the 
depositors learn they are impatient and withdraw the money today (it is their 
dominant strategy). The remaining two patient depositors have to decide whether to 
withdraw their money today or tomorrow. We can model their behaviour in a 2x2 
normal form game.  
 
Let us look at this game when R=1.5 and L=.5. If both patient depositors wait until 
tomorrow they would both receive £1500. If one withdraws today and the other 
tomorrow, the one withdrawing today receives £1000; however, the one withdrawing 
tomorrow will receive 0 because the bank needs to liquidate all its long-term 
investment to meet the extra demand of £1000 today (£2000*L=£1000). If both try to 
withdraw today, then the bank still needs to liquidate all of its long-term assets. Now 
the bank doesn’t have enough to fulfil the extra £2000 demanded by its contract. 
How much can the bank pay out? It has £2000 in the short term investment and 
£1000 from liquidating its long-term. It has to divide this among the 4 depositors 
withdrawing today (two patient and two impatient). Thus, on average, each would 
receive £750. All these payoffs form the normal form game presented below: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
prefer 5000 today to whatever amount the bank can pay tomorrow, since that amount is less than 
R*5000. 
 Depositor 1
Depositor 2
Today
Today
Tomorrow
Tomorrow
1500
1500
R=1.5, L=.5
0
0
1000
1000750
750
 
 
There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game: both patient depositors 
withdrawing today and both patient depositors withdrawing tomorrow. The bank run 
equilibrium is where both withdraw today. While this equilibrium is Pareto inferior, 
both have incentive to withdraw today since single-handedly deviating to 
withdrawing tomorrow will yield a payoff of zero. Hence, we theoretically 
demonstrate that while damaging, a bank run can be a rational, equilibrium 
phenomena. In the next section, we show how one can also demonstrate a bank run 
in the laboratory. 
 
Experimental procedure 
Non-computerized 
 
Two versions of the Diamond Dybvig Model are run simultaneously in five rounds 
where students submit decisions for the patient depositors. Each student in a group of 
seven must decide simultaneously whether to withdraw money today or tomorrow. 
The game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, everyone withdraws today or 
nobody withdraws today. Payoffs are higher when nobody withdraws today. The 
game has a “white” version and a “green” version.  The “white” version requires less 
other depositors to withdraw today in order for it to be profitable to do so as well. 
Almost invariably, students coordinate on the withdraw today equilibrium in the 
“white” version and on the withdraw tomorrow equilibrium in the “green” version. 
 
Timing: The experiment takes up to 30 minutes overall. Additional time may be 
allocated to more class discussion, possibly in a different lecture.  
 
Preparation: It can save time if students are given instruction sheets at least a day 
before the actual experiment. This is particularly important if not all students are 
native English speakers. 
 Preparation of Decision Sheets: The students should be divided into two roughly 
equal sized groups. Each group should get differently coloured decision sheets (we 
used white and green). The decision sheets can be cut into the five decision strips and 
stapled. One not very time consuming procedure is to take two types of coloured 
paper and just use a paper cutter to cut strips. Ask the students to take 5 strips at the 
beginning of class. Alternatively, one can simply print the sheets with the round 
numbers, 1-5, written on them, a blank for the name and the two choices to circle. 
Have the students tear off the decision strips during the experiments. 
 
To be planned in advance: 
• How are you going to split the students into two groups, e.g. male/female or 
left/right half of the room? Does the room design provide a natural way to do the 
split? 
• Do you wish to use two students, one for each version (white/green) to collect the 
decision strips? 
• Will you give the students the data to evaluate the experiment? How?  
• If you want to give money / prizes decide how. (In one version, we had 20 
candies and in another £20 available which we would use to pay one randomly 
selected student according to his gains in one randomly selected round.)  
• The design below, where each student in, say, the white group plays against the 
decisions of six randomly selected members of the white group, is made for large 
classes. In smaller classes one may count how all students in the group decided 
and let each student play against that statistic. (Notice that some students play 
against themselves in our design, but this does not affect the Nash equilibria.) If 
you have fewer than 14 students in your class, further adjustments of the design 
are needed, which we leave to the instructor. 
 
Procedure: 
 
Choose two students as assistants to help you in running the experiment, one for each 
colour. Give them the differently coloured decision slips and the instructions and 
explain them how to distribute them. While the students distribute the sheets, draw 
the table for the results at the board. Summarize the main points from the instruction 
sheets. 
 
Give the students three minutes (later 1 minute) to make their choices and turn in the 
decision strips. Advise the students to write down their own decisions for themselves 
on a separate piece of paper. You may require that the decision strips contain round, 
name and decision (1 or 2). Alternatively, you can just require the decision and 
collect the sheets using different plastic bags for each round. 
 
Ask the two assistants to collect up the decision strips for each group separately. 
Suppose the decisions of the white group are collected first. Then select randomly six 
decision strips from the white group. Write on the board how many of the six 
students chose 1 and how many 2. Given these six choices, state the payoff of any 
student who chose 1 and that of any student who chose 2. Do the same for the green 
group. 
 Repeat the above for rounds 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
 
After the experiment, to save your time and to help the students learn, you may want 
to hand the data (slips) collected to small groups of students for writing summary 
evaluations. 
 
The following table provides numbers that worked successfully in practice. These 
numbers were generated using R=1.2, L=0.2 and a £10 deposit for the white group 
and R=2.0, L=0.8 and a £10 deposit for the green group.    
 
Of the 6 others in 
your group, the 
number that choose 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Your amount if you 
choose 2 and are in a 
white group. 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £4 £12 
Your amount if you 
choose 1 and are in a 
white group 
£6 £6 £7 £8 £8 £9 £10 
Your amount if you 
choose 2 and are in a 
green group. 
£0 £8 £13 £16 £18 £19 £20 
Your amount if you 
choose 1 and are in a 
green group. 
£9 £10 £10 £10 £10 £10 £10 
 
Notice that in both cases, there are two pure-strategy equilibria. If one believes that 6 
others will withdraw at time 2 (tomorrow), it is worthwhile to withdraw at time 2. If 
one believes that no one else would withdraw at time 2, it does not make sense to 
withdraw at time 2. 
 
After one or two rounds, the two groups will diverge: members of the white group 
will choose time 1, while members of the green group will choose time 2. The white 
group in all likelihood will go to the bank run equilibrium.  
 
Computerized (Feele Lab website) 
 
Detailed Procedure 
 
The computerized version of this experiment is available on the Feele Lab website.  
The procedure for setting up and running this experiment for the first time is as 
follows: (1) locate the Feele Lab homepage, (2) optionally, do a quick test log-in, to 
experience the experiment from the point of view of one of your students, (3) register 
your email address to obtain an experimenter’s username and password, (4) log in as 
an experimenter, (5) create a new Diamond Dybvig experiment, (6) add a default 
session to this experiment, (7) change some of the default configuration values, e.g. 
number of subjects, (8) start the session running, (9) invite your students to log in to 
the session as ‘subjects’ while you watch the ‘Monitor Log-Ins’ screen, (10) start the 
experiment running, and (11) watch the ‘View Results’ screen to observe your 
students making decisions. 
 
To locate the Feele Lab homepage, do a Google search for the word ‘feele’ and click 
on the first link, FEELE Laboratory.4 
 
To do a quick test log-in, pretending to be a student, click on the large-font link, 
Lecturers: Run Experiments here, to display the Lecturers: Run Teaching 
Experiments page then, in the Quick Log-In section, click on the bullet-pointed 
[ log in ] link for the Diamond Dybvig bank run experiment5.  Note: further up the 
page, in the Getting Started section, is an Economics Network Presentation (MS 
PowerPoint) which you may find helpful; right at the end of it is a series of screen-
shots explaining how to register and log in as an experimenter and create your first 
experiment. 
 
To register your email address, start from the Lecturers: Run Teaching Experiments 
page (see above) and click on Experimenter (lecturer) access (new window);6 the 
browser should open a new tab showing the Feele Lab Experimenter Access page.  
Click on the Register button [New Experimenter Registration] to bring up the 
Experimenter Registration page.  Now enter your initials, your email address and 
your first and last names; your username will be emailed to you and consists of the 
initials you entered plus a numeric suffix.  For the sake of an example, let us assume 
that your username is ‘abc1’. 
 
To log in as an experimenter for the first time, click on the Login Now button and 
enter your new username and password in the boxes provided on the Experimenter 
Login screen.  (On subsequent occasions when you log in as an experimenter, you 
will need to start from the Feele Lab Experimenter Access page.  You then bring up 
the exact same Experimenter Login screen by clicking on the Login button 
[Experimenter Login].)  If you have logged in successfully, you will see a screen 
entitled, ‘abc1 - View Experiments’, where ‘abc1’ is your username. 
 
To create a new experiment, click on the Add Experiment button.  Set the 
Experiment Type to ‘Diamond Dybvig’ using the drop-down list and enter ‘banking’ 
as the Access Suffix.  (The Access Suffix is a code word of your own choosing that 
your students will need to know to be able to log in to your experiment.) 
 
To add a default session to the new experiment, starting from the View Experiments 
screen, click on View Sessions to bring up a screen entitled ‘Experiment abc1-
banking (Diamond Dybvig) – View Sessions’.  Then click on Add Session to create 
session #1. 
 
To change the default configuration values, starting from the View Sessions screen, 
click on Configure to bring up a screen entitled ‘Experiment abc1-banking (Diamond 
Dybvig) - Configure Session #1’.  There is a Confirm button at the end of the dialog, 
for saving your changes.  There are several configuration values that you may wish 
to change: 
                                                 
4
 http://www.projects.exeter.ac.uk/feele/ 
5
 http://www.projects.exeter.ac.uk/feele/feele_experiments/subject_access.php?quick=diamond 
6
 http://www.projects.exeter.ac.uk/feele/feele_experiments/experimenter_access.php 
• Number of Subjects: the number of ‘subjects’, i.e. student computers; it must be 
a multiple of the Number of Investors (Group Size) (see below) and defaults to 
10.  The value you choose for the number of subjects will depend on the size of 
your class and on the number of computers you have.7 
• Proceed At Own Pace: we recommend changing this to ‘Yes, allow groups to 
proceed at own pace.’, which will allow faster progress.  The default option, ‘No, 
wait for all subjects to complete each round.’, is slower because individual 
groups cannot proceed to the next round until all subjects (in all groups) have 
made a decision in the current round.8 
• Number of Treatments: if you wish to configure more than one treatment (see 
example treatments below), you should select ‘Two treatments’ or ‘Three 
treatments’ and click Confirm; additional configuration values for the second and 
third treatments then appear, which you can change before clicking Confirm for a 
second time to save your changes. 
• Number of Investors (Group Size): the group size, i.e. the total number of 
investors, both impatient and patient, for each game; it defaults to 10.  The 
Number of Subjects (see above) must be a multiple of this number.  If you change 
the group size, you must adjust the bank’s reserves, i.e. the Bank’s Initial Cash 
On Hand (£) and Bank’s Initial Investment in Illiquid Asset (£); you will almost 
certainly also wish to adjust the Number of Impatient (Type A) Investors. 
• Number of Impatient (Type A) Investors: the number of impatient investors in 
each group.  The default is to have 5 impatient investors in a group of size 10, 
which implies that there are also 5 patient investors.9 
• Option #1: Suspend Payments Until Tomorrow: the maximum number of 
investors to be paid today, before the bank suspends payments until tomorrow; or 
0 (the default) if the bank is not to suspend payments.  You can use this option to 
reduce the likelihood of a bank run by preventing the bank from running out of 
money.  Assuming the default group size of 10 with 5 impatient investors, the 
bank will not run out of money if it suspends payments after 5 investors have 
been paid today.10 
• Option #2: Deposit Insurance: the percentage of any bad debt from the bank that 
will be paid by the government; or 0 (the default) if there is no such deposit 
insurance.  You can use this option to reduce the likelihood of a bank run by 
                                                 
7
 For example, with a large class of size 50+ but only 20 computers, you might set the number of 
subjects to 20, leave the group size set to 10, and ask the students to pair up in twos and three to share a 
computer.  The 20 computers will be divided anonymously into two independent groups, who will each 
play a 10-investor version of the game. 
8
 If you select the ‘own pace’ option, as recommended, the groups stay the same in all 3 treatments, 
whereas with the default ‘wait for all’ option, the subjects are randomly re-grouped between 
treatments. 
9
 If you change the group size, e.g. to 14 instead of the default of 10, you may also wish to adjust the 
number of impatient investors, in this case to 7 instead of the default of 5, so that you preserve an equal 
number of impatient and patient investors. 
10
 If 6 or more investors decide to withdraw today, the bank selects 5 of them at random to be paid 
today and defers payment for the remainder until tomorrow, when they are paid alongside those who 
had originally decided to wait until tomorrow. 
guaranteeing that investors will by paid a percentage of whatever the bank owes 
them, if it runs out of money.11 
• Payoff Tomorrow to Impatient (Type A) Investor from £1 Investment (£): the 
impatient investor’s utility from waiting until tomorrow to withdraw £R, where R 
is the return on the bank’s long term investment.12  It is always worth less than £1 
to the impatient investor to withdraw £R tomorrow; default value £0.50. 
• Payoff Tomorrow to Patient (Type B) Investor from £1 Investment (£): the 
patient investor’s utility from waiting until tomorrow to withdraw £R.  It is 
usually worth £R (and always worth more than £1) to the patient investor to 
withdraw £R tomorrow; default value £2.00. 
• Payoff Today to Bank from £1 Investment in Illiquid Asset (£): (default value 
£0.50): the return (< 1) on the illiquid asset for withdrawals made today; L in the 
model. 
• Payoff Tomorrow to Bank from £1 Investment in Illiquid Asset (£): (default 
value £2.00): the return (> 1) on the illiquid asset for withdrawals made 
tomorrow; R in the model. 
• Bank's Initial Cash On Hand (£): the bank usually starts with £1 per impatient 
investor held as cash on hand; default value £5.00. 
• Bank's Initial Investment in Illiquid Asset (£): the bank usually starts with £1 
per patient investor invested in the illiquid asset; default value £5.00. 
• Number of Paying Rounds: you should configure a minimum of about 5 rounds 
(default is 1 round), to allow time for the results to converge to one or other 
equilibrium. 
• Grouping Type: we recommend changing to ‘Fixed’ groupings (default is 
‘Random’), so that your students remain matched in the same groups of 
(nominally) 10 subjects during a treatment. 
 
Click on Confirm to save your changes. 
 
To start the session running, starting from the View Sessions screen, click on Start 
Run; the Status of the session changes from Ready (navy blue) to Running (green).  
This step is important: your students won’t be able to log in if you forget to start 
the session running!  To monitor you students as they log in, you should now click 
on Monitor Log-Ins to bring up the log-in monitoring screen; this screen has a 10 
second auto-refresh by default but you can click on Disable Refresh if it becomes 
annoying. 
 
To log your students in to the running session, tell them to locate the Feele Lab 
homepage, as you did, by doing a Google search for the word ‘feele’ and clicking on 
the first link, FEELE Laboratory.  They should then click on the large-font link 
Students: Log In here;13 the browser opens a new tab showing the Feele Lab 
Participant Access page and they then click on the Login button [Participant Login] 
                                                 
11
 The bank pays whatever it can and then the government pays a percentage of any debt the bank is 
unable to honour. 
12
 Remembering that the bank does not make a profit. 
13
 http://www.projects.exeter.ac.uk/feele/feele_experiments/subject_access.php 
to bring up the Participant Login screen.  In order to log in to your experiment, they 
need to enter an Access Code, which is ‘abc1-banking’, where ‘abc1’ is your 
username and ‘banking’ is the Access Suffix that you entered when you created the 
experiment (see above).  Note: if your students are using Internet Explorer, it is also 
possible to run the Feele website in kiosk mode14, as described on the Lecturers: Run 
Teaching Experiments page. 
 
You should keep an eye on the Monitor Log-Ins screen whilst your students are 
logging in.  If more (or less) students turn up than you had expected, you can use the 
Change button to adjust the number of subjects upwards (or downwards), but only by 
a multiple of the group size (default value 10).  If a student logs in twice or you have 
an odd number, you can use the Disconnect button to remove any that are surplus to 
requirements. 
 
Once everyone has logged in successfully, you must check the box and press the 
Start Experiment button, to allow your students to start the experiment itself.  This 
step is important: your students are held at a wait screen and won’t be able to 
start reading the instructions or making decisions if you forget to start the 
experiment!  You can now press View Results to see the results monitoring screen, 
where you can watch your students make their decisions. 
 
                                                 
14
 http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/feele/LecturerStart.shtml#kiosk 
Sample Configuration 
 
Here is a sample three-treatment configuration for use with groups of 18 students.15  
Each investor makes a £1 deposit.  Treatment 1 is generated using R=2.0 and L=0.5, 
whereas treatments 2 and 3 are generated using R=1.1 and L=1/B, where B is the 
number of patient investors; in this case, B=9.  Where there is a change to a default 
configuration value, e.g. for the Number of Impatient (Type A) Investors, this is 
shown as *9, where * indicates a non-default value. 
 
 Common Configuration Values 
Number of Subjects *18 (or any multiple of 18) 
Proceed At Own Pace *Yes, allow groups to proceed at own pace. 
Number of Treatments *Three treatments. 
 
Treatment 
1 
Treatment 
2 
Treatment 
3 
Number of Investors 
(Group Size) *18 *18 *18 
Number of Impatient (Type 
A) Investors *9 *9 *9 
Option #1: 
Suspend Payments Until 
Tomorrow 
0 0 *9 
Option #2: 
Deposit Insurance 0 0 0 
Payoff Tomorrow to 
Impatient (Type A) 
Investor from £1 
Investment (£) 
0.50 0.50 0.50 
Payoff Tomorrow to 
Patient (Type B) Investor 
from £1 Investment (£) 
2.00 *1.10 *1.10 
Payoff Today to Bank from 
£1 Investment in Illiquid 
Asset (£) 
0.50 *0.11 *0.11 
Payoff Tomorrow to Bank 
from £1 Investment in 
Illiquid Asset (£) 
2.00 *1.10 *1.10 
Bank's Initial Cash On 
Hand (£) *9.00 *9.00 *9.00 
Bank's Initial Investment 
in Illiquid Asset (£) *9.00 *9.00 *9.00 
Number of Paying Rounds *8 *10 *5 
Grouping Type *Fixed *Fixed *Fixed 
 
The following table is in a similar format to the non-computerized experiment and 
shows, for the above configuration, the expected payment received by a patient 
                                                 
15
 An identical configuration was used to generate the computerized results detailed below. 
investor, related to how many other patient investors wait until tomorrow to 
withdraw.16 
 
Of the 8 other patient 
investors, the 
number who 
withdraw tomorrow 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Expected payment to 
patient investor 
withdrawing 
tomorrow in 
treatment 1 
£0.0
0 
£0.0
0 
£0.0
0 
£0.0
0 
£0.4
0 
£1.0
0 
£1.4
3 
£1.7
5 
£2.0
0 
Expected payment to 
patient investor 
withdrawing today in 
treatment 1 
£0.7
5 
£0.7
9 
£0.8
4 
£0.9
0 
£0.9
6 
£1.0
0 
£1.0
0 
£1.0
0 
£1.0
0 
Expected payment to 
patient investor 
withdrawing 
tomorrow in 
treatment 2 
£0.0
0 
£0.0
0 
£0.0
0 
£0.0
0 
£0.0
0 
£0.0
0 
£0.0
0 
£0.0
0 
£1.1
0 
Expected payment to 
patient investor 
withdrawing today in 
treatment 2 
£0.5
6 
£0.5
9 
£0.6
3 
£0.6
7 
£0.7
1 
£0.7
7 
£0.8
3 
£0.9
1 
£1.0
0 
Expected payment to 
patient investor 
withdrawing 
tomorrow in 
treatment 3 
£1.1
0 
£1.1
0 
£1.1
0 
£1.1
0 
£1.1
0 
£1.1
0 
£1.1
0 
£1.1
0 
£1.1
0 
Expected payment to 
patient investor 
withdrawing today in 
treatment 3 
£1.0
5 
£1.0
5 
£1.0
4 
£1.0
4 
£1.0
4 
£1.0
3 
£1.0
3 
£1.0
2 
£1.0
1 
 
Treatments 1 and 2 have two pure-strategy equilibria, whereas treatment 3 has a 
single equilibrium.  (Note that the expected payment to a patient investor 
withdrawing today in treatment 3 is higher than £1 since there is a chance that he will 
not receive the £1 today.  If there is already a suspension of payments, the investor 
may be forced to withdraw tomorrow.)  
 
In treatment 1, one is better off withdrawing tomorrow so long as one believes that at 
least 6 others will do so, otherwise it makes sense to withdraw today.17  This 
treatment can converge either to the normal equilibrium (all withdraw tomorrow) or 
to the bank run equilibrium (all withdraw today). 
 
In treatment 2, one is better off withdrawing tomorrow if one believes that all 8 
others will do so, otherwise it makes sense to withdraw today.  This treatment rapidly 
converges to the bank run equilibrium because it only requires one investor to panic 
and withdraw early for the bank to run out of money. 
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 It is reasonable to assume that the 9 impatient investors are rational and therefore all withdraw today. 
17
 Indifferent between today and tomorrow if 5 others withdraw tomorrow. 
In treatment 3, it always makes sense to withdraw tomorrow, regardless of how many 
others do so. 
 
Hints and Tips 
 
Before running this experiment for the first time with real students, it is a good idea 
to set aside a few minutes to configure and run a short test session where you log in 
dummy subjects using multiple browser tabs and play, say, 1 round of each 
treatment, just to gain familiarity with the computer interface. 
 
Just as with the non-computerized version of this experiment, if you have a high 
percentage of students for whom English is not a first language, it will speed up the 
class if you email or circulate the Part 1 instructions to the students in advance. 
 
It will speed up the logging in process if you circulate hand-outs to the students 
explaining what to do; if you number the hand-outs beforehand, it will make it easier 
to count up how many students there are when configuring the software. 
Some results and suggestions for classroom discussion 
Results from a computerized session 
 
The following figure shows the results of a classroom experiment run in Exeter on a 
single group of 18 students.18  Investor types (roles) were randomly re-allocated at 
the start of every round, with 9 students being type A (impatient) investors and 9 
students type B (patient) investors.  The experiment lasted 23 rounds and there were 
3 treatments.  In the first treatment, lasting 8 rounds, conditions were set for R=2 and 
L=.5 (we call this ‘normal conditions’).  Toward the last few rounds of this 
treatment, the students settled into the normal equilibrium.  Type A’s withdrew today 
and type B’s withdrew tomorrow.  In the second treatment, lasting 10 rounds, we had 
R=1.1 and L=.11.  We might refer to this as a ‘credit crunch’.  Tight conditions for 
the bank: not much leeway if depositors try to withdraw early.  In this treatment, 
there was a run on the bank.  In the third treatment, lasting 5 rounds, we also had 
R=1.1 and L=.11, but payments were halted after 9 depositors withdrew from the 
bank early.  This suspension stopped the run on the bank.  There was an instant effect 
that steadily improved. 
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Suggestions for classroom lectures and discussion 
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 There were 18 computer terminals and the students were paired up with an average of two to a 
computer. 
As mentioned before, it is desirable to run the experiment before the lecture. I then 
like to show video clips from two Hollywood movies: Mary Poppins and It’s A 
Wonderful Life. These can really liven up a lecture. Mary Poppins is able to show 
how runs can start from rumours and how banks close their doors to stop further 
withdrawals. It’s A Wonderful Life shows how a systemic risk can cause a run. 
Jimmy Stewart also explains how a bank works by borrowing short and lending long. 
The movie also explains why a suspension can cause significant damage to 
depositors (some need money to live).  
 
After this, one can start explaining the Diamond-Dybvig model as described above. 
If the students have studied normal form games, the reduced version of the game 
between two patient depositors captures the intuition of how there are two (pure-
strategy) equilibria.  
 
After explaining the model, one can bring up some of the many examples of modern 
bank runs. After this, one can explain possible policies that could help prevent bank 
runs in the future and what is missing from the model.  
 
Modern Bank Runs. 
 
We first started developing this classroom experiment before the Northern Rock 
bank run, so it is surprising in some sense to see many examples of modern bank 
runs. Here is a selection of some of the major ones. 
 
Northern Rock 
The most visible bank run in the UK was the 2007 run on Northern Rock. There were 
long queues of depositors outside the bank. As we learned, it was perfectly rational 
for depositors to want to withdraw their money early. Northern Rock did not follow 
the Diamond-Dybvig model precisely by taking money from depositors and 
investing part of it in the long-term investment. Instead, they invested amounts far 
beyond their levels of deposits. Naturally, this money had to come from somewhere 
and Northern Rock met this shortfall by borrowing from other banks. In essence, 
other banks became the depositors. When the subprime crisis hit, the mortgages that 
Northern Rock made were still performing, the problem was that these other banks 
acting as depositors became impatient and “withdrew” their money. 
 
Etrade 
In the era of Internet banking, a bank run takes a whole new form. While Etrade may 
have had sufficient insurance to cover almost all of its deposits, there was a run on 
the bank (participated in by one of the authors) since it was easier to transfer money 
out than to read in detail the deposit insurance description. Etrade survived (so far), 
but suffered significant damage in both reputation and by the necessity of having to 
liquidate billions in assets. Now Etrade makes sure their deposit insurance is well 
known. 
 
Bear Stearns 
Bear Stearns was an investment bank founded in 1923 and in 2007 had 14,000 
employees. It focused on stock investments, hedge funds and brokerage (based upon 
the historical division of banks). Customers were firms and professionals. The 
market cap was at $20 billion in 2007 ($170 per share). Two hedge funds lost 
billions in 2007. On March 11, 2008, there was a “bank run”. Money was withdrawn 
from accounts, within two days capital balance went from $17 billion to $2 billion. 
They couldn’t sell assets instantly to cover demand and needed to borrow $30 
billion. On Friday, March 14th, 2008, the Fed guaranteed a loan of $30 billion from 
JP Morgan to Bear Sterns. On Sunday, March 16th, 2008 it was announced that JP 
Morgan would buy the company for $2 a share (200 million total) later raised to 
$10/share. This is about the value of their building on Wall Street (worth more than 1 
billion dollars). 
 
As Krugman (2007) points out, in today’s financial world, a modern bank run does 
not have to be standing in a queue nor even have to happen at a bank. It can happen 
at hedge funds and many other financial institutions that borrow short-term and lend 
long-term.  
 
Iceland 
At the beginning of 2008, Iceland had a GDP of about 20 billion pounds (population 
of 300,000). Icelandic banks had deposits of 120 billion pounds (in foreign 
currencies).They lent the money to groups that bought assets. There was a run on 
Iceland and the country had to nationalize the three main banks. They suspended 
payments to a half million depositors: including many UK city councils (almost 1 
billion pounds worth) and universities. The Icelandic government was only 
responsible for the first 15,000 pounds, but still is struggling to pay this amount.  
 
Lehman Brothers 
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers with over 600 billion in assets filed for 
bankruptcy. The US government decided to let it fall. It isn’t clear whether there was 
a solvency or a liquidity problem. Still, this decision was controversial and may be 
considered a mistake of the magnitude of when the Fed allowed the Bank of the 
United States to fail in 1930 with 400,000 depositors, of which Friedman and 
Schwarz (1963) say helped steer the US into the great depression. History will help 
tell us how large the contagion effect was from the collapse of Lehman and whether 
avoiding this would have been worth a bailout. As for the Bank of the United States, 
it eventually paid 80 cents on the dollar and that was in the Great Depression.  
 
Washington Mutual 
On September 25, 2008, Washington Mutual went bankrupt after a 10-day bank run 
with withdrawals of $17 billion. This was the largest US banking failure to date. 
Washington Mutual had assets of $330 billion and 50,000 employees. 
 
 
Prevention: 
 
Now one can explain possible ways to help avoid a bank run or lower the effect. 
 
Signalling. One of the older techniques was to put money in the windows of the 
bank. This is sending a signal that the bank has enough money so there is no need to 
panic. There are modern day equivalent of signals such as getting a large investment 
from Warren Buffett (as Goldman Sachs did).  
 
Suspension of payments. What was done in the past was to suspend payments. This is 
closing the doors and preventing further withdrawals. We saw this was effective in 
the experiment, but there is a problem when the number needing money today is 
uncertain. One may also want to discuss when a partial suspension may help 
(lowering payments the larger the number that try to withdraw). Also, instead of a 
suspension, a bank may try to slow down payments.  
 
Coordination. Another way to avoid a bank run is when there are a limited number 
of depositors. We can have what is called creditor coordination. We saw this with 
Long Term Capital Management, a large hedge fund that ran into trouble in 1998. 
Their problems were similar to a bank run, in that all the creditors demanded their 
money, which suppressed the value of LTCM’s assets. This run was stopped by a 
legendary meeting organized by the NY FED with the creditors. Another famous 
creditor coordination meeting was held by JP Morgan (himself) in the 1907 banking 
panic. 
 
Lender of Last Resorts. Another solution is using the lender of last resort. Central 
bank steps in and loans the bank money to replace deposits. This should work with 
depositors in the case of a problem with simple liquidity. The danger is that it creates 
a moral hazard problem (see below). For instance, in 2007 both Northern Rock and 
Countrywide ran into problems. Countrywide had bothered to secure lines of credit 
ahead of time (at an expense) if it ran into trouble. Myopic Northern Rock did not. If 
the Bank of England simply lent Northern Rock money, it might encourage other 
banks not to bother obtaining lines of credit in the future. 
 
One needs to be careful about using this facility. In 1975, April 14th, Credit Suisse 
announced that it had lost some money in one of its branches. It didn’t mention 
details. April 25th, The Swiss Central Bank announced it was willing to lend money. 
This had the opposite result causing share price to tumble 20%.  
 
Narrow banking.  
We said that bank runs are inherent if the bank serves to convert short term demands 
into long term investments. Another idea which dates back to Milton Friedman 
(1948) (also see Shy and Stenbacka, 2008) is for narrow banking, that is where each 
bank keeps 100% of its deposits as reserves. This has the advantage of preventing 
bank runs, but then consumers would have to pay more for banking services.  
 
Deposit Insurance. 
The final tool that is useful to prevent bank runs is Deposit Insurance. If the amount 
you have in the bank is fully insured, you have no incentive to try to withdraw early. 
However there may be a delay before one gets payment. Also, the deposit insurance 
scheme may not be foolproof. As with Iceland, even if a government backs the 
scheme, there is still the possibility of sovereign debt default. Also, usually, deposit 
insurance is not 100% of all deposits. It can be capped and as we saw in the UK it 
was only partially covered until the cap. This still left open the possibility of a 
rational bank run.  
 
 
 
Missing from the model. 
 The Diamond-Dybvig model is beautiful in its simplicity, but this simplicity comes 
at a cost. It is also worthwhile to discuss what is not captured in the model. Two 
important elements missing from the model are uncertainty and moral hazard. 
 
Uncertainty. There may be uncertainty in depositors’ preferences. So far we assumed 
there was no aggregate uncertainty, that is, there is exactly one impatient depositor 
for every patient depositor. In reality, there may be changing macroeconomic 
conditions that cause more than the usual number of depositors actually to need the 
money today. This makes a suspension less desirable as a mechanism to stop bank 
runs since the bank would also be preventing those that actually need the money 
from withdrawing. 
 
Another thing lacking from the basic model is the riskiness in the long-term 
investment. There can be riskiness in R. Perhaps sometimes there really isn’t enough 
money to meet demand tomorrow. In such cases, it will be worthwhile to withdraw 
money independent of what others do. Thus, sometimes a bank run will be unique. 
This also brings us the issue of opacity of the investment and how much of the true 
return is known to depositors (see Kaplan 2006). With the sub-prime crisis we saw 
that the return from mortgage based derivatives was indeed risky and at least for a 
while the status of the investments was unknown to the depositors. 
 
There can also be riskiness in L. Perhaps, at times of a systemic problem, the 
liquidation value is lower. At Long Term Capital Management, the mere fact that 
LTCM owned an asset lowered that asset’s value (see Lowenstein 2000).  
 
Moral hazard.  Probably the most important element missing from the model is 
moral hazard. The basic idea comes from insurance. Say you buy theft insurance for 
a laptop. Because you buy the insurance, you may be more likely to leave the laptop 
in your car when you pick up the milk on the way back from work. Ideally, you 
would like to commit to not leaving the computer in your car (computer thieves love 
to hang around convenience stores waiting for prey).  Sometimes, we can contract on 
it (most current theft insurance for laptops do not cover theft if it is left in a car). 
Other times, we can’t.  
 
It is thought that a moral hazard problem is created when there is deposit insurance 
(see Kane, 1989). In the 1980s over a thousand Savings and Loan banks in the US 
went bankrupt. They originally lent money out at fixed rates of 6% and paid deposits 
3%. However, starting in the mid 1970’s high inflation rates forced the banks to pay 
interest rates upwards of 10% (higher than 6%). Since their balance sheets were in 
trouble, they decided to take higher risk in an attempt to overcome their deficits. 
They lent money to riskier clients such as Latin American countries.  Ultimately, the 
Savings and Loans crisis cost US taxpayers $120 billion. 
 
The banks were able to take high risk due to the deposit insurance. In most cases, 
depositors did not care whether or not their bank took risks since they knew their 
deposits were insured. This in essence has the insurance corporation subsidize the 
risky behaviour. It is possible that for this reason, deposits in the UK were not fully 
insured and why in many cases the insured amount is capped.19 Bearing some risk 
would give the depositors incentive to be wary of banks taking on excess risk. (One 
may ask whether depositors are able to check the riskiness of a bank’s portfolio and 
whether this should be their job.) Unfortunately, while a co-pay insurance may 
reduce the moral hazard problems, it keeps the multiple equilibrium problem, as the 
UK discovered. At least one way to ameliorate the problem is to base deposit 
insurance premiums upon risk. The US did just that with Federal Deposit Insurance 
Reform Act of 2005, allowing the FDIC to charge premiums based upon risk.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we demonstrated how bank runs can occur in a simple classroom 
experiment and that they are inherent in any institution which borrows short term and 
lends long term. We end the paper how we would end a lecture. In the episode “The 
PTA Disbands” of The Simpsons, the bank run of It’s A Wonderful Life is parodied. 
Bart Simpson starts a bank run and the Jimmy-Stewart-like bank manager explains 
how he doesn’t have the money: “It’s at Bill’s house and Fred’s house!” Moe sees 
Fred and says, “What the heck are you doing with my money in your house?”, and 
punches him. Hopefully, after this lecture the nature of banking and bank runs will 
not be so confusing to your students. 
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 Before the subprime crisis, the UK had 100% of deposits covered up to £2000 and 90% of those 
between £2000 and £33000. At that time, the US had FDIC insurance of $100,000. Since then the UK 
has increased the insurance to 100% of the first £50,000 and the US increased the insurance to 
$250,000. 
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Instructions for Banking Experiment. 
 
1. You are a depositor and have your money in a bank. You have to decide whether 
to withdraw today at time 1 or tomorrow at time 2. There are 6 other depositors that 
have to make the same decision. The bank only has a limited number of reserves and 
if too many try to withdraw today, it will have to sell an illiquid asset and be unable 
pay the full amount promised tomorrow.  
 
2. At the beginning of the lecture, you will receive 5 strips of paper – one for each of 
five rounds of the experiment. About half of you will receive white coloured strips of 
paper and the other half green strips of paper.  
 
3. At the beginning of each round, on the strip of paper you will have to write (a) the 
round, (b) your name, and (c) circle your decision: either “1” (withdraw today ) or 
“2” (withdraw tomorrow). The instructor will then collect the strips from everyone. 
 
4. The instructor will select 6 white AND 6 green strips for that round. The instructor 
will then write the 6 decisions for each colour on the board. These decisions will 
represent the decisions of the other 6 depositors in your group. Your profits for that 
round will be determined according to the following table. 
 
Of the 6 others in 
your group, the 
number that choose 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Your amount if you 
choose 2 and are in a 
white group. 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £4 £12 
Your amount if you 
choose 1 and are in a 
white group 
£6 £6 £7 £8 £8 £9 £10 
Your amount if you 
choose 2 and are in a 
green group. 
£0 £8 £13 £16 £18 £19 £20 
Your amount if you 
choose 1 and are in a 
green group. 
£9 £10 £10 £10 £10 £10 £10 
 
5. The instructor will then select one more white strip and one more green strip. The 
instructor will demonstrate the calculation of the amount for that 7th depositor. 
 
6. The experiment will repeat for 5 rounds from step 3. 
 
Please make sure you understand the instructions before class but please do not 
discuss this before class.  
 
Good luck.  
 
